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IO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. 0. KINGSTON I 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 15323 
GREAT SOUTHWEST FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff insured against 
the defendant insurance company alleging that defendant wrong-
fully failed to compensate plaintiff for a fire loss to a ware-
house located in Salt Lake City. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both sides stipulated to the facts and the case was sub-
mitted to the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, District Judge for the 
Third Judicial District. The Court ruled that plaintiff did 
nQt have an insurable interest in the warehouse at the time of 
t:,e fire and f d therefore gr:anted judgment in favor of de en ant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Crcfendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1971 plaintiff, J. 0. Kingston, purchased a builfac 
located at 9th South and 8th West for approximately $ 34 ,oou, 
(Deposition of J. O. Kingston taken April 13, 1977, pp. H 
This purchase price included both the building and the grou:. 
(Deposition, p. 8). It was used as a general warehouse for 
products handled by Mr. Kingston. (Deposition, p. 8). 
Defendant-respondent, Great Southwest Fire Insurance 
Company, issued a policy of fire insurance in the total 
amount of $20, 000 providing fire insurance coverage for thE 
warehouse building with effective dates of May 10, 1975 to 
May 10, 1976. (R. I p. 8 8) • 
On July 3, 19 7 5 Salt Lake City Corporation commenced a 
condemnation action pursuant to a resolution by the Salt Lai' 
City Commission against plaintiff, J. O. Kingston and others 
to condemn the property and building in question for the pur· 
pose of erecting a Senior Citizen's Center. The actioowu 
entitled Salt Lake City Corporation v. J. O. Kingston, e,1:.!! 
No. 228991. (R., p. 88; Ex. A). Kingston was served with 
Summons on July 14, 1975. (Ex . A. , p. 15) . 
On the 30th day of July, 1975, Salt Lake City corporat:: 
f ·he 
filed its Motion for an Order of Immediate Occupancy 0 ' 
Premises. (Ex. A, pp. 24-27). Attached to the Motion was 
de termined the an affidavit of a real estate appraiser who 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
value of the property to be $33, 000. (Ex. A, pp. 26-27). 
on August 12, 1975 an Order for Immediate Occupancy was 
granted by the Honorable Bryant Croft permitting the City to 
occupy the premises and: 
... to take immediate possession of said 
property of Defendant as required and as 
described and as set out in Plaintiff's 
complaint, and to continue the possession 
of the same pending hearing and trial on 
the issues that may be raised in this ac-
tion, and to do such work thereon as may 
be required for the purposes for which said 
premises are sought to be condemned and ac-
cording to the nature thereof. (Ex. A, pp. 
30-33). 
In addition, the Order of Immediate Occupancy required the 
City to deposit at least 75 per cent of the appraised value 
of defendant's property with the Clerk of the Court and in 
addition restrained Kingston from hindering or interfering 
with the occupation of the premises. Accordingly, the City 
deposited 100 per cent of the appraised value of $33, 000. 
(R., p. 89; Ex. A, p. 33). 
Approximately 38 days later a fire occurred at the ware-
house and the building was totally destroyed. {R.,p.89). 
At the time of the fire plaintiff Kingston had certain mater-
ials in the warehouse which were not insured under the policy 
in question. (R., p. 89). 
Plaintiff contested the appraised value tendered to the 
~istrict Court clerk. An agreement was entered into between 
-3-
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plaintiff Kingston and Salt Lake City Corporation in May Oi 
1976 in which the City paid Kingston $49,000 and assign~ 
to Kingston any interest it may have had in the insurance 
proceeds. (Ex. A., pp. 79-81). The Final Order of Condem· 
nation was entered on June 29, 1976. (Ex. A, pp. 101-102), 
Before this agreement had been reached with Salt Lake 
City, Kingston filed a complaint against defendant Great 
Southwest Insurance Company on January 23, 1976, (R., pp, 
2-3) alleging wrongful refusal to pay pursuant to the polir 
The question of insurable interest was submitted to the lo·i; 
court upon stipulation of the parties and the court held t\: 
plaintiff had no insurable interest in the warehouse destro: 
and accordingly entered judgment in favor of the defendant. 
(R., pp. 89-92). It is from this judgment that plaintiff nc 
appeals. (R., p. 97). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO 
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE WAREHOUSE AT 
THE TIME OF LOSS. 
A. After Possession is Granted to the Condemning~· 
thority and Tender is Made Pursuant to Utah Eminent Dom~ 
Procedure, An Owner Loses any Insurable Interest in th~· 
demned Property. 
. f ,.,hether The instant case presents a simple question o · 
. tv whic'. 
an owner can claim an insurable interest in proper , 
-4-
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li has been condemned initially by the City but which no final 
award has been made. The answer to this question, however 
depends entirely upon the statutory law of Utah relating to 
insurable interest and eminent domain. For this reason, 
therefore, this case is unique in that this question has 
never been decided in the state of Utah interpreting these 
particular statutes. 
The critical importance of the statutory procedure was 
~cognized by the court of appeals of Kentucky in Patrick v. 
;; Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 413 S.W.2d 340 
i:: (Ct. App. Ky. 1967) when it said: 
We have considered the cases cited and have 
concluded that it would be pointless to 
extend this opinion by detailed discussion 
of them. It is apparent that the statutory 
provisions relating to eminent domain of 
the particular state involved are largely 
responsible for the results reached in these 
cases and, therefore, it is necessary that 
we consider the problem in the light of the 
Kentucky Statutes which are peculiar to the 
problem presented and contribute, in large 
measure, to the result reached. Id. at 343. 
The applicable insurance statute is as follows. Section 
31
-19-4 of the Insurance Code specifically defines "insurable 
interest" in the follm.-ing manner: 
1. No contract of insurance on property 
or of any interest therein or arising there-
from, shall be enforceable except for the 
benefit of persons having an insurable in-
terest in the thing insured. 
2. "Insurable interest" as used in this 
-5-
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section means any lawful and substantial 
economic inte~est in the safety or preser-
vation of the subject of the insurance 
free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary 
damage. 
This Court has addressed itself to the question of an 
"insurable interest" of property destroyed by fire on two 
separate occasions. In Hill v. Safeco Insurance Company,;: 
U.2d 96, 448 P.2d 915 (Utah 1969) this Court quoted with<:-
proval an authority which defined insurable interest of pre· 
perty as follows: 
Generally speaking, a person has an in-
surable interest in property whenever he 
would profit by or gain some advantage by 
its continued existence and suffer some 
loss or disadvantage by its destruction. 
If he would sustain such loss, it is imma-
terial whether he has, or has ·not, any 
title in, or lien upon, or possession of, 
the property itself. Id. at p. 917, fn. 
2 (Emphasis added). 
In National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Companyv. 
Thompson, 4 U.2d 7, 286 P.2d 249 (Utah 1955) this Court recc:· 
nized that such an insurable interest is necessary to preve:.: 
a person having no interest in property except a potential 
gain from its destruction to gamble upon its loss. 
Thus, it is clear what criteria should be used in deter· 
t must " 
mining an insurable interest and why such an interes 
shown. 
thorouahl. In this particular case it is necessary to · 
s,...ertai11 
examine the eminent domain procedure in order to a ~ 
the interest which the condemning authority and th( j,,, 
-6-
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in the condemned property. 
Chapter 34 of Title 78 concerns the eminent domain pro-
cedure in Utah. Section 78-34-1 defines when the right of 
~inent domain may be exercised. There is no question in 
this case that the condemning of appellant's property was pro-
per under the eminent domain statute. 
Section 78-34-6 prescribes what elements the complaint 
must contain. This procedure was strictly followed by Salt 
Lake City. (Exhibit A, pp. 1-3). 
Section 78-34-9 is entitled, "Occupancy of Premises 
Pending Action" and has been substantially amended in 1967 
from the original 1943 version. The original provision al-
lowed occupancy. of condemned property upon payment of a bond 
"not less than double the value of the premises sought to be 
condemned and the damages which will ensue from condemnation". 
~e original provision spoke in terms of a surety rather than 
an actual payment for the property taken. 
The amended 1967 section allows occupancy of the pre-
mises and permission to perform "such work thereon as may be 
required" upon filing with the Clerk of the Court "a sum 
equivalent to at least 75 per cent of the condemning authori-
ties' appraised valuation of the property sought to be con-
d~mned ·" The amended statute further provides interest at 
tr~ 
-.le rate of 8 per cent per annum to be applied to a formula 
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based upon whether the ultimate award of condemnation is 
greater or less than the initial deposit with the Clerk of 
the Court. This statute clearly speaks in terms of an ac-
tual payment for the value of the property since it is as-
sumed the taking of the property has already occurred as 
stated in 78-34-11. 
In the instant case Judge Croft entered an Order of Im-
mediate Occupancy on August 12, 1975 requiring at least 75 
per cent of the appraised value to be paid into the County 
Clerk Depository and restraining defendant from interf~i~ 
with the occupation and work of the premises. One-hundred 
per cent of the appraised value was actually deposited. 
Section 78-34-11 concerns when the right to damages ha'" 
accrued. This section states the following: 
For the purpose of assessing compensation 
and damages, the right thereto shall be 
deemed to have accrued at the date of the 
service of summons, and its actual value 
at that date shall be the measure of com-
pensation for all property to be actually 
taken, and the basis of damages to proper-
ty not actually taken, but injuriously 
affected, in all cases where such damages 
are allowed, as provided in the next pre-
ceding section. No improvements put upon 
the property subsequent to the date of 
service of summons shall be included in 
the assessment of compensation or damages. 
(Emphasis added) . 
l\1t' 
This Court in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City~ 
d 370 (Utah 19 74) held that the Investment Inc., 522 P.2 1 
-8-
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of crmdemned property is to be determined as of the date and 
under the circumstances existing at the time of the taking 
and that "ordinarily evidence of subsequent occurrences is 
not admissible as bearing thereon". Id. at 1372. 
Thus, under this provision Salt Lake City was legally 
bound to pay plaintiff Kingston the value of th"' property at 
the time the complaint was served (July 14, 1975) regardless 
of any subsequent events either adding to or decreasing this 
value. 
Section 78-34-15 essentially states that a court must 
~1ake a final judgment of condemnation describing the property 
condemned and the purpose of such condemnation and that a 
copy of this judgment must be filed in the office of the Re-
corder of the County in which the property is located and 
"thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the 
plaintiff for the purpose therein specified". 
Finally, Section 78-34-16 was substantially amended in 
1967 thereby changing the title from "Possession by Plaintiff 
Pending Appeal of Further Proceedings--Deposit--Payment, 
Effect--" to the new title reading "Occupancy of Premises 
Pending Action--Substitution of Bond for Deposit Paid Into 
r 
'ourt--Abandonment of Action by Condemner". The new 1967 
Deajment added a specific provision concerning the effects 
o: obct;-,d 0 nment of the condemnation action by the condemning 
-9-
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authority. The new statute states: 
Condemner, whether a public or private 
body, may, at any time prior to final pay-
ment of compensation and damages awarded 
the defendant by the court or jury, aban-
don proceedings and cause the action--"tClbe 
dismissed without prejudice, provided, how-
ever, that as a condition of dismissal 
condemner first compensate condemnee for 
all damages he has sustained and also reim-
burse him in full for all reasonable and 
necessary expenses actually incurred by 
condamnee because of the filing of the ac-
tion by·condemnor, including attorney's 
fees. (Emphasis added) . 
Applying this statutory scheme of eminent domain ~ fu 
facts of this case patently shows that at the til'le of the L 
Kingston had no insurable interest in the warehouse propert:. 
This conclusion is based on the following analysis. 
When Kingston first purchased the property in 1971, hs 
obviously had an insurable interest in it since, if the pro-
perty were to be destroyed, the risk of loss would be borne 
entirely by him. 
When the summons was served upon Kingston on July 14, 
1975 the value which Kingston could claim for the propertj' 
was limited to its worth as of that date. 
whether the value of the property went up or down subsequen: 
to the service of the summons. At that point in time, it is 
doubtful that Kingston had any insurable interest in the ere· 
Pal. d the full V3.lue of perty since he was guaranteed to be 
the property thus extinguishing any interest 
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'lal'e in it. However, he still retained the right of posses-
sion and, under some cases of other jurisdictions, could still 
claim an insurable interest because of his possessory right. 
on August 12, 1975 the Order of Immediate Occupancy was 
issued by Judge Croft and on August 14 a tender for the full 
amount of the appraised value was made to the Clerk of the 
district court. (Ex. A, pp. 30-33). 
At this time, three critical events occurred: first, a 
judicial deterrnina ti on was made as to the value of the pro-
perty subject to late:::- modification; second, all ric;hts of 
possession were lost by Kingston; and third, the risk of loss 
i~~ediately passed to Salt Lake City Corporation. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Patrick v. Kentucky 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 413 S.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 
Ky. 1967) explained the significance of this first element 
of judicial determination of market value. In referring to 
Kentucky statutes which allow a similar occupancy and payment 
into a court fund, the court stated: 
Thus, it appears that prior to the destruc-
tion of the property, appellant had been 
paid an amount of money which represented 
a judicial determination of the fair market 
value of the insured property. This judi-
cial determination was subject to appeal 
as to its amount, but it is also true that 
appellant was entitled to and was assured 
by operation of law that she would receive 
a judicially determined amount of money re-
0resenting the fair market value of the 
~roperty insured. 
-11-
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Since appellant had received a judic al2.:· 
determined amount of money represent ng t~e 
fair market value of the property pr or tc 
its destruction or loss and was not enti-
tled to possession of the property at the 
time of this loss, then it would appear fr.a: 
she would not have an insurable interest i:: 
the property. Id at 343. 
As to the second element of possession, even tf.c1~~'. 
Kingston maintained some of his personal property i:: :'.= : .. 
ing, the possession of the property was deemed to be :'=.: :: 
the City. In City of Rochester v. Greenberg, 244 "1.Y.s.:: 
(Sup. Ct. 1963), the City had condemned real propert:: a~.:· 
obtained an order directing the property owner "to del:'-·o: 
surrender possession of the property to the City of Roe~~ 
on or before June 30, 1961". The property owner did r.o: :,. 
liver possession and continued to collect rents from :':2 ;:: 
perty. Subsequently, the building collapsed. 
The City con tended that the owner rer..a ined in poss 0:0: 
and control of the property and, therefore, that the cc::;:· 
valuation date was after the property had colla~sed. -·-
York Court disagreed. The Court in that case stated: 
I have concluded that the city in fact had 
possession on and after that date although 
Mrs. Greenberg collected the rents and I 
have concluded that the rents she did col-
lect in fact are the property of the city 
and must be by her returned to the city. 
Id. at 424. 
Thus, the Order of Immediate Occupancy shifted t~'0 ::· 
to possession to the city and at the same tiwe ~aJ~ 
-12_ 
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_ -=-= :.e:.:.::t a.t will subject ccmp.ietely to the control of 
;. .. ~ .... -
_:1. si.--:iilar situation occurred in Van Cure v. Hart-
I:.surance Comoany, 253 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1969). In 
o=.se, t'."le condemning authority initiated a complaint 
o:?.:;.s:: i:':'1e ,:rope:::ty owner and obtained a court order allow-
-.; ::~e condemning aut!l.ori ty to enter the premises and take 
::ssess1on. _;;t the same time, it tendered a $37 ,000 bond 
.~:o t!"',e clerk's depository. The authority permitted the 
;::o;:ert•; owner to remain in possession in order to reduce de-
:s;.::on d~:.ages. A fire destroyed the premises subsequently. 
>.e cou:ri:, in addressing its elf to the possessory interest of 
:':s ;:rc:_=erty owner, stated the following: 
As for any other legal interest in appel-
lant, the only plausibl~ argument made is 
that her right of possession was interrup-
ted by the fire. However, this right was 
not enforceable since she remained at the 
will of the Authority who could have her 
removed at any time. The Authority allow-
ed her to remain in possession only because 
it suited its financial interests by reduc-
ing detention damages, and no court could 
order the Authority to continue her posses-
sion. Consequently, appellant possessed 
no legally enforceable interest that could 
support the policies of insurance. Id. at 
666. 
T1 e ~hird effect of the order of occupancy was an immediate 
:ie risk o= loss. The city under the statutory frame-
•·. ~. '. :: :::n2.:;.e:1t domain became responsible for the property con-
~t~ right of possession. In Chester Litho., Inc. 
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v. Palisades Interstate Park Commission, 317 N.Y.S.2d 761 
(Ct. App. N.Y. 1971), a building was condemned by the Park 
Commission but the occupants were allowed to remain. Under 
the laws of New York, an order of irnmediate occupancy was r.c: 
required since the title passed upon the filing of the actic 
While the court relied upon the passing of title as its ba· 
sis for the decision in that case, the language shows ili& 
the passing of the right to possession also transfers the rt 
The court stated: 
If this were a sale in fact, the risk 
would be upon the purchaser, here the ap-
pellants, under either the Uniform Vendor 
Purchaser Risk Act ••• or the common law. 
Pursuant to the more stringent statutory 
provision, the risk passes with either ti-
tle or possession. 
No unfair burden is placed upon appellants, 
for, if they intend to utilize a condemned 
building, they have an insurable interest 
for their protection. Id. at 762-763. 
The court consequently held that the risk of loss of the bu: 
ing which was destroyed by fire was entirely borne by the cc 
demnor-appellant. This is in accord with California law wr,;: 
states that the risk of loss to improvements remain on tne 
owner until title, possession, or the right to possession:: 
transferred to the condemnor. California Law Review C~ 
· and:• 
Recornmendation and Study Relating to Taking Possession.::::.----
, b 1960,. 
sage of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings, Octa er~ 
B-17; see also Van Cure v. Hartford Fire Insura~~,-~_0'.f'.£~~ 
-14-
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. 2d 663 (Pa. 1969) (After bond is filed, all risk of loss 
·'· 
of condemned property passes to condemnor). 
A further consequence occurred as a result of the Order 
of Immediate Occupancy. From that point on, Salt Lake City 
corporation became responsible for the property, even in the 
event the condemnation proceeding was later abandoned. Sec-
tion 78-34-16 allows abandonment, but specifically requires 
the condemnor to compensate the owner for all damages sus-
tained because of the condemnation. Obviously, had the pro-
ceeding been subsequently abandoned, the city could not return 
to Kingston a burned out building without compensating him 
for his loss. 
This Court on two occasions has held that a condemner 
is liable for any damages occurring during the time of the 
condemnation when a subsequent abandonment has occurred. As 
stated by this Court: 
The majority of the decisions hold that 
the rule that a municipality is not lia-
ble for damages sustained by the property 
owner resulting from the institutions of 
condemnation proceedings which are subse-
quently abandoned does not apply in in-
stances of actual damage to the freehold, 
or when the condemnor takes possession of 
the property. Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 
176 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1947) (Emphasis 
added). 
-
See _also N 
=-2.rth Salt Lake v. Saint Joseph Water and Irrigation 
~n:, 233 P.?d 577 (Utah 1950). 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This position is consistent with cases in other juris. 
dictions having similar statutes concerning abandonment, ;. 
City of Silverton v. Porter, 559 P.2d 1297 (Ct. App, Ore. 
1977), the court stated "A condemner which takes prejudgmer,, 
possession of property and subsequently elects to abandon 
its condemnation action is liable in damages to the condern.1, 
both for loss of use of the land and for physical injuries 
thereto." See also Johnson v. Climax Molybdenum Company, i:. 
P.2d 929 (Colo. 1942); Van Cure v. Hartford Fire Insurance 
Company, 253 A.2d 663, 667 (Pa. 1969). ("Appellant contena: 
that since she may have her property returned to her, she 
an interest in the preservation of that property. She em 
in two respects. After a bond is filed, all risk of loss 
passes to the condemner. If the Authority is to return the 
property, it must make her whole with respect to any damage: 
and losses. Thus, appellant could not sustain any pecuniar 
loss."); 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain, Section 339, p. 271. 
Thus, it is obvious that the Order of Immediate Occupa' 
eliminated any insurable interest Kingston may have had pri:· 
to the entry of the order. The value that Kingston was to: 
ceive for the property was fixed regardless of whether the 
· d d t d The fi' re could haven' property was improve or es roye . 
effect upon the ultimate condemnation award. 
Likewise, while Kingston may have been using 
the buJJ;: 
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as a "shelter and protection for the merchandise inside" (Ap-
pellant • s brief, p. 12) , such shelter is certainly not within 
the "substantial economic interest" requirement of the sta-
t~e. His only economic interest was in the property con-
tained in the building which was not insured under this pol-
icy. To hold otherwise would allow a tenant to insure his 
landlord's building or a trespasser to insure a building in 
which he sleeps at night. Such insignificant "interests" do 
not give rise to a recovery from insurance. 
Finally, even had the entire condemnation proceeding 
~~abandoned, Section 78-34-16 of the Utah Code specifi-
cally requires the condemning authority to make the owner 
whole once again. It goes without saying that Salt Lake City 
could not have abandoned the condemnation proceeding and 
turned the ruined building back to Kingston without compen-
sating him for its diminished value. 
The criteria enumerated in the Hill case by this Court 
that a person must profit by or gain some advantage by the 
building's continued existence or suffer some loss or di sad-
vantage by its destruction is applicable to Kingston and his 
interest · h in t e warehouse building. Kingston had neither 
cotential . 
· gain nor potential loss. 
At the time of the fire, Kingston's only claim to the 
'"~~'"" Wc1c, ~ bare legal title. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-
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---
13) . But as this court stated in the Hill case, " [I] t is 
immaterial whether he has. . . any title in. . . the propert\ 
itself." 
917 fn. 2. 
Hill v. Safeco Insurance Company, 448 P.2d 91S, 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals likewise stated: 
It is true that at the time of the des-
truction of the insured property, appellant 
had a legal title to it, but the fact that 
the name insured had a legal title to the 
insured property is not conclusive of the 
existence of insurable interest as the trial 
court correctly discerned as evidenced by 
its citation of Cook's Adm'r. v. Franklin 
Fire Insurance Company, 224 Ky. 360, 6 S.W.2d 
477. Patrick v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company, 414 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ct. 
App . Ky. 19 6 7 ) . 
Kingston's legal title to the property was immaterial. 
For example, unlike a vendor who holds such title as a secur· 
ity interest in the property and who is entitled to insure 
his interest until such time as he is obligated to convey le· 
gal title, Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial District Court, Sli 
P.2d 739 (Utah 1973), Kingston had no security interest in 
the property. He had already been paid the assessed value o: 
the property and could only argue that he was entitled to 
more money. There was no continued contract in which he ha: 
any right to reclaim the property as in a real estate ~~~ 
ment or a mortgage. the Cl. ty abandoned the :r:· Likewise, had 
perty, he would have been returned to his original condit'.c: 
interim whi:: 
and compensated for any damage done during the 
b'." tielcl '· 
again did not require any security interest to 
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legal title. 
Therefore, an analysis of the specific facts and sta-
:utes in this case amply supports the trial court's conclu-
3100 that plaintiff Kingston had no insurable interest in 
:he warehouse at the time the fire occurred. 
B. The Authorities Cited By Plaintiff Are Generally 
Distinguishable Upon The Facts Or Statutory Laws. 
As noted earlier in this brief, the particular statutory 
scheme upon which a decision is based is of crucial impor-
tance in this type of case. A cursory reading of the authori-
ties cited by plaintiff may give the impression that this 
exact problem now facing this court has been decided in a 
number of jurisdictions in favor of plaintiff's position. 
However, a close analysis of these cases generally reveals 
distinguishing facts or statutory law which make these authori-
ties inapplicable. It should be reiterated once again that 
llie question presented on this appeal has never been decided 
under Utah statutes by this Court and, therefore, cases in 
other jurisdictions cited by both sides or cases of this Court 
in previous decisions may or may not be helpful. 
The Hill v. Safeco Insurance Company case cited by Ap-
?ellant (Appellant's brief, p. 4) has already been cited by 
'le 
· spondent in this brief as defining the standard to be applied 
'1' ...:i 
-· ~eter~lning whether an insurable interest exists. A close 
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examination of the facts in Hill show that there was a sub-
stantial interest in the preservation of the building by t.'., 
insured far beyond anything claimed by the plaintiff Kingst: 
and his interest in the warehouse which was destroyed, In 
Hil 1, the insured-deceased, through whom the estate claimed 
the insurable interest, had deeded the building (his house) 
to his wife. By will, his wife gave the insured a life es-
tate in the home. This Court found: 
[H]e had a life estate therein established 
by a will executed by Lila, a right of occu-
pancy of the premises and a few other lit-
tle unmentionable incorporeal hereditaments. 
448 P.2d at 916. 
Here, the plaintiff Kingston had none of the rights found i.·· 
portant by this Court in the Hill case. Kingston had no li: 
estate in the warehouse, in fact, he had no estate whatsoevE: 
he had no right of occupancy to the premises as the right 
existed entirely with the city pursuant to the court order. 
The Stuart case decided by this Court and cited by -~Pf'-
lant (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-5) involved the interpretati: 
of Utah statutes concerning the transfer of automobile titk 
This Court found that the sellers of the automobile had fai> 
cernincr ;;. 
to comply with the requirements of the statute con ' 
and that therefore the heirs retained an interest in the ca: 
since it had not been legally sold. In this case, however, 
, . th ~nd J-k 
the eminent domain statutes have been ccmpl1ed Wl . w· 
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2 ~try of the Order of Immediate Occupancy transferred posses-
s~n of the building and risk of loss to the city, thereby 
orecluding any insurable interest of Kingston. For this rea-
son, the Stuart case dealing with an automobile is not rele-
vant to the interpretation of the eminent domain procedure. 
The Thompson case cited by Appellant (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 5-6) is the only case decided by this Court as to the 
interpretation of the insurable interest statute. A close 
reading of the Thompson case shows that Thompson was in a 
fu different position than plaintiff Kingston in the present 
case. In Thompson, there were numerous facts representing 
"a substantial economic interest" that are not present in the 
instant case. The insured in Thompson had: 
(1) Obtained an agreement with the new owner for 
retaining possession of the buildings. 
(2) The insured had obligated himself to the new 
owner to protect the buildings from loss. 
(3) Both the insured and the new owner expected that 
the use of the building would be paid for by the insured-prior 
owner. 
(4) The insurance company had been made aware of 
t~e sal . . . 
e and agreed to accept the renewal premium in the in-
sured' s name. 
~:Jrnoa::ing the elements of "interest" in Thompson to the 
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elements of "interest" in Kingston we see they are substar.· 
tially different. In Thompson, there was an agreement to: 
cupy the premises, but in this case, there was an orderd~ 
vesting possession. In Thompson the insured had a duty to 
protect and pay rent while in this case there was neither~ 
obligation to protect nor any offer to pay. In Thompson t~.' 
insurance company knew of the change of ownership and agree: 
to continue coverage--here there was no such knowledge on:.·. 
part of defendant. The defendant-respondent submits that t' 
only interest plaintiff Kingston had in the warehouse was l: 
the insurance proceeds should the warehouse be destroyed by 
fire. Such an interest does not constitute an insurable i:· 
terest under Section 31-19-4 Utah Code Annotated. 
The respondent submits that the Thompson case is des-
positive of the present situation and clearly sets for~~ 
purpose of the statute requiring "insurable interest", the 
purpose being that public policy does not allow an individ'" 
to gamble upon the destruction of something that he has no:· 
terest in. If such were not the requirement underlying the 
principle of insurable interest, it would always be to a cor: 
. . d troyed b1' demnee's benefit to see his condemned building es · 
fire. 
The Irwin case cited by Appellant (Appellant 
15 bne'.-
p. 7) is distinguishable on the fact that the cas~ 
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~~ abatement of a nuisance--not a condemnation of a building 
,,nth just compensation. In addition, the insurance company 
:iad fUll knowledge of the court orders abating the nuisance 
brt continued the policy in effect. In the instant case, the 
p?:operty was only taken after compensation was paid for it 
a~d there is no evidence that the insurance company was aware 
that the building had been condemned. 
The Rosenbloom case (Appellant's brief, p. 7) reaches 
its result based upon one section of the New York Insurance 
~a·,.; and one section of the New York Real Property Law. Both 
rtrtutes concern the sale of property by contract and the 
effects such contracts have upon fire insurance and risk of 
loss. Since these statutes do not concern condemnation nor 
are similar Utah statutes involved in the present case, the 
cited authority is inapplicable. 
Likewise, Illinois statutes were at issue in the American 
clational Bank case relied upon by Appellant (Appellant's brief, 
~. Bl· The city had filed a petition for condemnation, but 
:lad made no tender of the purchase price nor obtained any or-
der of possession. The Illinois statute only required the pay-
~ent of the property owner's expenses for an abandonment to 
occur and did not require damages to be paid for any loss· 
cJch statutes and procedure is once again inapplicable to the 
-::cntr'Jversy. 
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The Virginia statutory scheme in Home Insurance c 
om pa 
v. Dalis referred to by Appellant is also distinguishable. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10). Under Virginia law, acer+: 
ficate is filed estimating the value of the property to be 
condemned. The parties then have sixty days to agree toa 
fair price before an actual condemnation proceeding has bee 
No judicial determination whatsoever had been made in the 
Dalis case at the time the fire occurred. The court ~l~ 
upon the fact that any condemnation action could be nullifi; 
and therefore held that even though title under the Virgin:; 
statute had originally passed upon the filing of the cert1· 
ficate, the fact that it was defeasible kept the risk ofk 
with the property owner. The court in that case stated: 
Until the right of the State Highway Com-
missioner to have the certificate invalidated 
and to abandon the condemnation proceeding 
had expired, the plaintiffs would have a pe-
cuniary interest in protecting the buildings 
against loss by fire. Thus, plaintiffs had 
an interest in the buildings that they need-
ed to protect against loss, and they had an 
insurable interest in them when they were 
destroyed by fire. 141 S.E.2d at 724. 
d . ff from the Utah stat: These statutes are, of course, i erent 
d b donment where no such loss would have occurred even ha a an 
taken place because of the obligation to compensate the ow~,e: 
for damages. 
Finally, the Oregon case of Fenter v. 
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and Life Assurance Corporation, is also distinguishable ~ire 
upon its facts, The case involved the sale of real property 
for a failure to pay taxes and had nothing to do with con-
demnation proceedings. The trial court sustained a demurrer 
to the complaint wholly as a matter of law holding that the 
~laintiffs failed to show any interest in the property des-
troyed at the time of the fire. The Oregon Supreme Court held 
that there was a possibility that the plaintiff had been darn-
aged from the fire, but stated it could not measure the pro-
babilit:,r of such loss from the mere allegations of the corn-
plaint. The court concluded, "He should have an opportunity 
to prove what he stood to lose, and what loss he actually 
suffered, as a result of the· fire." 484 P.2d at 314. 
This same question might be asked in the instant case. 
;vhat evidence is there that Kingston stood to lose anything 
or actually suffered a loss as a result of the fire. It is 
evident from the statutory eminent domain procedure that King-
s~n could suffer no loss whatsoever regardless of the build-
ing' s fate. 
Finally, the remaining arguments of Appellant should be 
answered. Appellant states that a double recovery is per-
~issible since defendant insurance company agreed to insure 
~~e build· ing and that disallowing a claim by plaintiff would 
~mount tc. a "1.vindf all" to the insurance company by allowing 
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it to "avoid payment for a loss which it voluntarily · , lnour;: 
against." (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14) . It should be n:·. 
however, that unlike the Thompson case, there is no eviden: 
that the defendant insurance company was aware that the bui. 
ing had been condemned. Thus, it is hardly fair to say t:,a-
the company had accepted premiums to insure the condemned 
building and now was trying to avoid its obligation. The 
policy was issued on May 10, 1975, over three months befor: 
the condemnation proceedings began. 
Additionally, the plaintiff argues that had it not bee: 
for the anticipated insurance settlement in this case, plai:.· 
tiff would not have settled for the amount finally agreed t: 
with the City. (Appellant's brief, p. 13). This argument 
must be termed incredible. Plaintiff initiated this lawsur 
against defendant Great Southwest Fire Insurance Company 0~ 
January 23, 1976. (R., pp. 2-3). Some five months later, 
while this action was still pending and while defendant in· 
surance company had still refused to make any payment on t): 
claim, plaintiff settled with Salt Lake City stipulating t'.i:: 
it was "a reasonable settlement for the value of the p::oper: 
sought to be condemned." (Exhibit A, pp. 79-80). The fact 
l. nterest i· t may have in the fire that the city assigned any 
insurance policy certainly does not indicate that the amo'n: 
Way by the hoped for insun· settled upon was reduced in any 
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proceeds. It is ludicrous to assume that respondent is re-
sponsible for any settlement agreed upon by plaintiff which 
was less than the actual value of the property. Had plain-
tiff sincerely believed he was entitled to more money, he 
could have litigated his beliefs in the condemnation action. 
rt must, therefore, be assumed just as the stipulation states, 
that the $48,500 paid to plaintiff was indeed a "reasonable 
settlement." 
CONCLUSION 
Without extensively reviewing the numerous authorities 
cited by both sides in this controversy, it can be simply 
said that plaintiff Kingston neither suffered nor could suf-
fer any loss from the destruction of the warehouse building. 
The statutory procedure of eminent domain adequately pro-
tects a property owner from loss and places the burden upon 
the condemning authority especially after an Order of Occu-
pancy has been obtained. 
To allow the recovery to plaintiff in this case would 
amount to a true "windfall" since plaintiff has already been 
fully compensated for the complete value of the building. 
While it is true that courts 1 · · generally construe po icies a-
gainst the i· h · d i' t nsurance company and in favor of t e insure , 
is also t · 
rue that courts must adhere to the public policy of 
;nsurabl<> ; .. . ~ "' 1 terest in order to prevent a wagering on disaster 
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